While the sovereign debt crisis of the Euro zone raises numerous economic issues that are broadly discussed in public, it also involves a large number of legal questions that are, in contrast, rarely talked about.
1
This crisis is a result of enormous amounts of debt that have been accumulated by a number of currency union member states. Investors question the sustainability of these states' debt and suspect default, and as a result require high-risk yields or abstain altogether from investing in sovereign bonds from those countries. A number of countries have been cut off from market financing due to this issue. It started with Greece in May 2010, followed by Ireland later that year and then Portugal in early 2011. 2 More recently, Cyprus has joined the group of recipients of financial aid, and Spain has requested help for its financial sector. 3 Italy is still able to receive market funding but risk premiums have gone up significantly, prompting the ECB to intervene heavily in the sovereign bond markets.
B. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE ISSUE
The current crisis is unique in several respects. For the first time in post-war history, highly developed countries are on the verge of 522
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defaulting. In addition, this crisis affects an entire region comprised of several countries whose future prospects could hardly diverge more. Four of the currency union members have kept their top ratings (Germany, Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg), but the sovereign debts of the other members have been downgraded, some so significantly that their sovereign bonds have been referred to as "junk bonds." 5 In the post-war era, the rules of the Paris and London Club were sufficient to find solutions for the effects of unsustainable debt and sovereign defaults on underdeveloped or emerging economies. 6 By assembling the major creditors who would agree on a debt restructuring, uncontrolled defaults could be avoided. These principles prevailed even during the Latin American crises of the 1980s and 1990s, though further 6. See PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) ("The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertake reforms to stabilize and restore their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club creditors provide an appropriate debt treatment. Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor countries in the form of rescheduling, which is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional rescheduling, reduction in debt service obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set date (stock treatment)."). The London Club is less institutionalized. The term stands for a forum of commercial banks in which they negotiated haircuts for sovereign debtors. 
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efforts were also needed, such as with the introduction of Brady bonds. 7 The Argentine crisis marked the beginning of a new level of sovereign default, as it illustrated that the amount of debt that had been accumulated by highly industrialized nations eclipsed traditional methods of managing the default. The discourse that followed did not produce practical results, 8 which is why there are no ready solutions for responding to the current Euro zone crisis.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that the highly indebted countries of the EU are part of a currency union. Thus, they are no longer in control of the policies governing their currency. The monetary policy is set by the Council of the ECB that consists of seventeen governors, the heads of the National Central Banks ("NCBs") of the member states, and the directorate of the ECB. 9 This Council decides the currency policy of the union by majority vote, with binding effect on all impacted member states. 10 This policy is executed jointly by the ECB as well as the NCBs that are subject to the ECB's instructions.
11
As a result, the Euro zone countries are limited in their responses to the crisis; in addition, the current crisis raises issues that have never before occurred.
Traditionally, a country with unsustainable debt implements emergency measures to regain sustainability. The ultimate goalnotably, economic growth-requires drastic measures to increase a country's competitiveness. Such measures include austerity, default, and restructuring, as well as inflation coupled with depreciation of the 
12
Austerity efforts are limited by their recessive effects on the economy and may even prompt social unrest. Both default and restructuring send out negative signals to the markets and discourage potential investors. 13 Therefore, monetary depreciation caused by expansionary monetary policy, potentially coupled with "quantitative "easing," seems like the most feasible solution. It may raise the country's competitiveness, since low production costs could attract foreign investments and a weak currency generally boosts exports. These benefits come with the unavoidable side effect of high inflation, but any negative effects are mitigated if the debt is denominated in the local currency.
14 Since monetary policy is decided by the ECB, a currency union member could not enforce such measures on its own. The ECB's most efficient instrument to steer inflation and manage the exchange value of the Euro is its power over the money supply.
15
Even if the ECB decided to depreciate the Euro, it would hardly help the struggling union members. Most members trade predominantly with other member countries, leaving their export industry in practically the same position. 16 For a member of the currency union, debt within the union is therefore comparable to debt denominated in a foreign currency (foreign debt). 
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The measures that can be taken autonomously are drastically limited; they include default and the search for external help.
II. RESCUE AND STABILIZATION EFFORTS
In response to the limited options of a currency union member state, the union itself has provided emergency help to ease the pressure on indebted countries and to protect the interests of the union as whole.
A. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL FACILITIES
Financial support for Euro zone members faces several legal obstacles. The most obvious is that it is the EU, not the Euro zone, which has a legal personality and related organs and institutions.
17
The legal framework of the EU generally does not differentiate between currency union members and other EU countries.
18
The EU is more factually than legally divided into a group of seventeen currency union members and ten countries that either chose to keep their national currencies or have not yet fulfilled the criteria necessary to join the currency union. Even the ECB is an institution of the EU, and the European System of Central Banks ("ESCB") includes the central banks of all twenty-seven EU Member countries and the ECB.
19
The sovereign debt crisis predominantly affects the countries of the currency union. All highly indebted countries whose debts have been downgraded and who face serious obstacles to receiving market financing under sustainable conditions are Euro countries. Furthermore, the currency union fears for the stability of the Euro, and as a result its more stable members are also affected. This creates a serious dilemma for the EU. Drastic emergency measures on the EU level are impeded 
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Direct Financial Aid
The highly indebted member states receive funding from member states of the currency union and international organizations. The tools applied are similar to a corporate restructuring. The indebted country leaves the markets for a limited time, while public financing helps to break the vicious cycle of downgrades and higher financing costs.
To date, five countries have profited from direct financial assistance. In May 2010, Greece became the first country to receive help from the European Financial Stability Mechanism ("EFSM"), the IMF, and bilateral loans from currency union member states. 24 The European Financial Stability Facility ("EFSF") was established shortly afterwards to help Ireland, Portugal, and later on, Greece.
25
In June 2012, Spain joined the group as the fourth recipient of Euro zone financial aid from the EFSF.
26
The fifth beneficiary shortly followed; Cyprus submitted an official request for financial assistance to the Euro group on June 25, 2012. 
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Commission containing policy conditionality."
32
To pursue this purpose, the EFSF issues bonds with underlying claims that are guaranteed by the Euro zone member states. 33 The individual share in the guarantees corresponds to the share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank.
34
As of May 2013, Germany's share, about twenty-nine percent of the debt, is the highest of the member states. The Euro zone has established a permanent funding scheme called the European Stability Mechanism ("ESM"). It was supposed to be effective on July 1, 2012, but the German president delayed its ratification in Germany to await the German Constitutional Court's decision in a preliminary hearing on the compatibility of the obligations arising from the ESM with the German Constitution. In September 2012, the court decided that allowing Germany to have an incalculable financial obligation to the ESM would be in violation of the budget autonomy of the German federal parliament. It ruled that Article 8(5) of the ESM treaty had to be understood as limiting Germany's total payment obligations to € 190,024,800,000 and that no provision of the ESM treaty "may be interpreted in a way that establishes higher payment obligations for the Federal Republic of Germany without the agreement of the German representative . . . ." 36 Furthermore, the court obligated Germany to "express that it does not wish to be bound by the ESM Treaty in its entirety if the reservations made by it should prove to be ineffective."
37
The ESM became the EU's permanent bailout fund after Germany ratified it on September 27, 2012 and deposited its instrument of ratification that same day. 38 32. Articles of Incorporation, supra note 30, at ch. 1, § 3. The language is originally from the EFSF Prospectus: EUR 55,000,000,000 Guaranteed Debt Issuance Programme (Feb. 13, 2012), at 57, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/ efsf_prospectus_dip_55bn_20120213_en.pdf.
33. See Framework Agreement, supra note 30, pmbl., ¶ 2, at 2. 34. However, in October, 2011, Greece, Ireland and Portugal were exempted from contributing, and, as a result, the shares of the remaining members went up, Germany's from 27% to 29%. 
Indirect Financial Aid
The EFSF may also provide indirect financial aid, as may the ESM. The EFSF is entitled to buy sovereign bonds of Euro zone countries for the purpose of avoiding soaring yields on those bonds, thereby ultimately preventing default. These purchases may take place in the secondary and, on an exceptional basis as stated in the EFSF Guideline on Primary Market Purchases of November 29, 2011, the primary market.
42
In addition, the EFSF can recapitalize credit institutions when a foreseeable crisis predominantly originates in the financial sector. The intention of this aid mechanism is reflected in the wording of the guidelines that explain, "[e]xperience has shown that some governments may not have large enough resources, especially where the size of the financial sector is large relative to the size of the economy. In these cases, the EFSF may serve as the last-resort instrument to preserve 39 As a prerequisite for financial aid, the guidelines require that "[a] beneficiary country will have to demonstrate that it has a sound fiscal policy record . . . and sufficient capacity to reimburse the EFSF loan . . . ." 44 In the future, a "banking union" may replace EFSF assistance in national financial sectors. Under these EU plans, supervision over financial institutions would be transferred from the national authorities to the European Supervisory Authorities and the ECB. 45 The ESM would gain the necessary power and tools to provide loans to recapitalize financial institutions throughout the EU. 46 These plans are part of the broader agenda to complement the monetary union with a thorough banking and fiscal union.
47
The risks to individual nations resulting from huge financial institutions operating from their territories would be eased by the currency union's joint liability for the soundness of these institutions.
However, these plans include the entire EU, and therefore the ten member states that are not part of the Euro zone. Some of these nonEuro zone countries have already voiced their objections to these plans. 46. For this purpose, the ESM Treaty, supra note 40, art. 3, excerpted below, will have to be amended:
The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding and provide stability support under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States. For this purpose, the ESM shall be entitled to raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial or other agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or other third parties. 
On the informal European
The "No Bail Out" Clause
Apart from the question of political will, there is the legal issue of whether the current rescue measures violate EU law. These legal questions have caused much controversy, not only among academics, but also among the central banks of the ESCB and national politicians in Euro zone member states. The controversy revolves around the wording of TFEU Article 125, which may prohibit the EFSF and ESM rescue measures. TFEU Article 122(2) does not cover the EFSF and ESM because under the EFSF and ESM agreements, financial aid is not provided by the EU, but by Euro zone governments, and Article 122(2) only refers to financial assistance by the EU. 50 The text of TFEU Article 125 provides:
(1) The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
(2) The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article. 51 The key legal issue is whether this ban is limited to the exact wording of the provision and therefore restricted to the assumption of commitments, or if a broader reading is required. 
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interpretation would prohibit any measure by the EU or a member state that provides financial help to another member state. A contextual interpretation of Article 125 supports the prohibition of any form of member state bailout. TFEU Arts. 120-126, which discuss the economic policy of the Union, reflect the market approach pursued by the TFEU. TFEU Arts. 122(2), 125, and 143 demonstrate that the Union pursues an approach of independent market financing for each member state, while TFEU Article 126 further provides strict rules on fiscal discipline. Financial support for member states is limited to exceptional cases, which are explicitly regulated in these provisions.
52
The counter-argument to this is that the Treaty provides for emergency measures in general, and an emergency situation such as the sovereign debt crisis requires adequate measures even if the Treaty did not foresee them. 53 This is certainly true, yet it calls for amendments to the fundamental principles establishing the currency union. The current framework may be flawed, but clearly seems to prohibit any form of financial assistance provided by the union or the member states to other member states. Long-term financing provided by the EFSF and ESM as a response to a lack of fiscal discipline undermines the imperatives of TFEU Article 126, which call for disciplinary measures for member states that infringe upon the rules, and not financial assistance. 
B. NON-STANDARD CENTRAL BANK MEASURES
The ECB has enacted a number of non-standard monetary operations in order to support indebted countries and the financial sector, some in addition to the funding provided by the intergovernmental financial facilities, and some which occurred prior.
Liquidity Provided by the Euro System
The Euro system ("System") consists of the ECB and the NCBs of the member states, whose currency is the Euro (TFEU Article 282 § § 1-2).
55
The ECB determines the monetary policy of the currency union, and the NCBs implement this policy by inter alia providing liquidity to credit institutions. The NCBs engage with credit institutions in "openmarket operations" that are part of the tasks defined by TFEU Article 127. 56 Liquidity is granted in exchange for adequate security as required by Article 18.1 of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB Statute. 57 Via a repurchase agreement, ownership of an asset is transferred to the NCB in exchange for liquidity in the amount of the asset's current market price (minus a haircut reflecting potential difficulties in realizing the asset). The parties agree to reverse the transaction through a retransfer of the asset to the counterparty on the repurchase day, which coincides with the maturity date of the typically short-termed lending operation. Such repurchase agreements are collateralized per se because they require a transfer of the ownership of the asset that underlies the agreement.
Loans, on the other hand, require separate collateral. In exchange for liquidity, the NCBs become creditors of the borrowing institutions and holders of security rights in full title to any assets offered as collateral.
58
The security rights remain with the NCB at least until 
Inflated Money Supply
In reaction to the crisis, the Euro system began expanding its supply of liquidity to the banking sector on August 8, 2007 by providing unlimited liquidity to banks in the Euro area on an overnight basis.
60
In the following months, it provided liquidity for periods of several months to facilitate planning for those same banks. The System also introduced the practice of "front loading"; 61 during the first half of the month, liquidity was distributed without limits. This had the intended effect of providing security for the banks. In the second half of the month, when banks were able to assess their actual demand, liquidity could gradually be reduced. Liquidity was thereby granted for longer periods than usual, yet due to the reduction in the second half of the month, the overall amount of liquidity did not increase. 
64
The high requirements for collateral became a serious obstacle for the credit institutions during the crisis. Consequently, the requirements were lowered significantly.
The Euro system applies uniform standards for eligible security assets to all Euro system credit operations. This harmonized standard applied to collateral is called the "single list."
65
As a general rule to limit the central banks' exposure to risk, the list requires that the title of the asset used for collateral is easily transferable and that the value of the asset is easily realizable.
66
Furthermore, external ratings of the assets are mandatory, and the Euro zone applies haircuts to the estimated value of the assets.
67
The general rule is that longer residual maturities of debt instruments result in higher haircuts than shorter ones.
68
These requirements were generally relaxed after Lehman collapsed and the financial crisis began to develop. The minimum rating requirement for central government debt instruments (sovereign bonds) was reduced to "BBB-" from A-; at the same time the haircut was raised by 5%, at first temporarily.
69
On January 1, 2011, these temporary changes became permanent. In February 2012, seven national central banks of the Euro zone decided to further ease the collateral requirements to encourage additional lending to banks. 72 In September 2012, the ECB expanded the list of eligible assets. Marketable debt instruments denominated in currencies other than the Euro and issued and held in the Euro area were declared eligible to be used as collateral. This measure comes with the suspension of the minimum credit rating threshold for all debt granted to or guaranteed by the countries participating in the Euro zone's bond purchasing programs. 
Covered Bond Purchase Programs
In order to provide liquidity for the market in covered bonds, the Euro system purchased covered bonds in primary and secondary 
Sovereign Bond Purchasing Programs
In its short history, the most drastic and criticized measure of the Euro system has been its program for the purchase of sovereign bonds of Euro zone members. The program started as a Securities Markets Program ("SMP") in May 2010 and authorized the Euro system to purchase sovereign bonds denominated in Euro. 75 Five countries benefited from the program. In addition to bonds issued by the beneficiaries of direct funding, which include Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and most recently Spain, the central banks of the Euro zone have also purchased Italian and Spanish bonds (in the case of Spain, prior to its application for direct EFSF funding).
76
In September 2012, the Euro system made the decision to start the "Outright Monetary Transactions" program to replace the SMP. 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
The aforementioned measures of the Euro system, which are determined by the ECB council and predominantly carried out by the NCBs, are supplemented by measures of the NCBs to provide further liquidity to financial institutions in need. 
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Liquidity Assistance ("ELA") is a more modern term for the traditional concept of "lender of last resort." The ELA provides liquidity to an individual or group of credit institutions, as opposed to liquidity supplied via monetary policy operations addressed to all market participants and the money market as a whole.
79
Recapitalization efforts such as by EFSF or ESM funding take time, whereas ELA assistance is more immediate. Several Euro zone banks, especially in Greece, are deeply troubled by the financial crisis and the bleak prospects in some local EU economies. They have been further weakened by massive withdrawals of depositors. As a result, their equity capital is negative and there exist no assets that might serve as collateral for central bank loans. Thus, ELA by the NCBs, e.g., the Greek central bank, is the major source of liquidity still available, as well as the ultimate emergency measure keeping these banks from collapsing.
C. LEGAL ISSUES OF NON-STANDARD EURO ZONE MEASURES
Justification by the ECB
Non-standard measures call for justification. These measures are unorthodox because they are outside the catalog of conventional monetary measures that central banks in the ESCB ordinarily apply. 81 The ECB argues that these measures are justified by a need to "address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism" and are therefore covered by its mandate in Article 18 of the Protocol. 82 The ECB has applied this 79 The ECB thereby expresses its concern that uncertainty in the markets may hinder the ECB from achieving its monetary goals in conventional ways. In ordinary times, central banks issue liquidity and leave further steps to the markets. 84 Before the crisis, the ECB similarly relied on the assumption that the provided capital would circulate in the markets and be allocated efficiently. 85 In this situation, banks serve as intermediaries and pass on the liquidity. However, these ordinary mechanisms fail in situations of uncertainty or even distrust in the markets.
Institutions store and accumulate liquidity instead of circulating and distributing it. Banks take loans from the NCBs and instead of passing on the capital in the form of loans to their customers, they deposit it with the NCBs. The banks thereby accept losses from the spread between their financing costs and the lower interest yield on deposits, instead of generating profits from forwarding the capital to the markets. In ordinary times, tendering restricts the money supply since the tendered amount is fixed in advance and bids will only be satisfied pro rata if the sum of bids exceeds the total amount of liquidity the central banks intend to distribute.
86
If stockpiling and general distrust coincide with restrictions on the money supply, massive shortages of capital occur in the markets. The central banks are advised to provide unlimited capital in an attempt to reestablish trust and achieve an efficient allocation of liquidity.
87
The bond purchase programs pursue a similar agenda. These programs are also based on the assumption that providing central bank liquidity will benefit the whole range of market participants, including governments that raise capital on the sovereign bond markets. When the bond markets dry up because investors withdraw over concerns about the sustainability of sovereign debt, monetary policy is imperiled.
The solution of the central banks in the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis has been to replace the investors in the secondary bond markets. The sovereigns still need to find buyers in the primary markets, but the intervention in the secondary markets by the Euro system sends out a strong signal to investors in the primary markets. Primary market investors need not fear to find themselves left with valueless sovereign bond investments since the Euro system will buy them up on the secondary markets.
For justification, the ECB emphasizes that it applies non-standard measures to pursue its main monetary goal of price stability in the Euro zone. 88 Factually, however, the ECB has given in to the demands for generous monetary support for frail countries and weak economies. 
Legal Issues
The purchase of sovereign bonds has been received with much praise in the media. 
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primary markets. The ECB considers purchases on the secondary markets to be outside of the wording of the ban. It has further been argued that the central banks only engage in ordinary market transactions as typically carried out by commercial banks. These transactions should be qualified as non-monetary as they are not based on any commercial relationships between the central banks and the governments.
96
Critics-including a minority of the central banks of the Euro zone, especially the German Bundesbank-argue that secondary market purchases are covered by the broader scope of the provision that banishes any attempt to finance sovereign debt by inflating liquidity.
97
This opinion relies on reasoning 7 of Regulation (EC) Nr. 3603/93, which prohibits central banks from circumventing the provisions of TFEU Article 123 through secondary market purchases.
98
It also corresponds to the design of the disciplinary principles of the currency union. They were critically summarized by Bini Smaghi, member of the ECB directorate until the end of 2011, in three principles: (1) the duty to discipline the governments falls upon the markets; (2) further discipline is forced upon the governments by the Stability and Growth Pact, if necessary by way of sanctions; and (3) the monetary union has been 
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built upon the principle that every member state should be forced to cope with the consequences of its fiscal policy individually.
99
Bini Smaghi has joined a large group of critics who conclude that at least the last principle has turned out to be illusory. 100 As already described above, 101 it is certainly true that the latest developments have shown the shortcomings of the Euro system architecture. However, the legal provisions of the TFEU as well as of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB still form the basis on which the monetary union is based. If the provisions and assumptions of the treaty are circumvented by ECB measures as well as rescue measures outside the union, it may be seen as an attempt to circumvent the democratic basis of the union. This may further erode trust in the union and raise doubts about whether the legal framework of the union is being accepted and followed by governments and central banks.
The strongest argument against bond purchases is that the ECB has converted them into a regular mechanism to influence the markets through its September 2012 decision. Initially, the argument that the bond purchases were merely a short-lived stability measure to overcome temporary failures in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy was persuasive. However, these measures have been extended to sovereign bonds of five Euro countries (with the potential of more to come) and have been said to be without "quantitative limits" unless termination is decided upon by the ECB Council.
102
Returning to the US perspective, these arguments against the nonstandard measures may seem exaggerated, as the Fed has frequently applied similar measures. 103 However, the situation in the Euro zone is by no means comparable to the situation in the US, neither from a legal nor economic perspective. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the EU (as well as the Euro zone) seems further from becoming a federal union than ever. The member states have been, and still are, sovereign 
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countries. The EU institutions and several heads of state and government have discussed plans to move on to the next step of a fiscal union, which transfers money from the richer to the poorer member states, collectivizes sovereign debt (and potentially private debt as in the case of financial institutions), and creates new competencies for the European Commission and the ECB-such as deciding the amount of transfers and debt for the individual member state.
104
However, discontent among voters in the member states is growing. As of now, the only unifying element throughout the EU seems to be general discontent regarding the current situation. These circumstances are predominantly blamed upon too much power over domestic policy in the hands of the supranational organs. Furthermore, such plans need the approval of the ten non-members of the EU, among them Sweden and the UK. It seems unlikely that these countries will support further transfers of powers to Brussels. This opposition became apparent at the ECOFIN meeting of the EU finance ministers in September 2012.
105
As of May 2013, the Euro zone is more comparable to a random group of seventeen of the fifty US states than to the US as a whole. Imagine a monetary union of seventeen randomly picked states including some with entirely different profiles, such as New York or California, as opposed to Montana or Kansas. Now imagine further that there was no political union and that the economic ties were limited to free trade and a common monetary policy. 106 The states would share a central bank, which would purchase a large number of the states' The European monetary union has been established based on the assumption that the ECB would pursue one goal alone: price stability.
107
Financing of member states was meant to be left to the markets, which would base investments on their assessment of a state's fiscal situation. The markets were meant to punish any failure in discipline by the member states. As mentioned above, these concepts proved illusory. The markets overestimated the potential of a common currency; they made refinancing significantly cheaper for the currency union member states than before under their individual currencies.
108
In addition, it seems questionable to burden the central banks with duties that truly should be imposed on the governments. At the same pace that the central banks step up their efforts to replace the disappearing investors, the governments reduce their efforts to improve the attractiveness of their bonds with a combination of austerity measures (in ineffective fields) and stimulus measures (in fields which show potential). This may result in negative incentives or, put differently, in moral hazards.
109
III. SOVEREIGN DEFAULT AND RESTRUCTURING
The bitter lesson to be learned from the Euro zone crisis is that highly developed countries are not immune from crises that were in the past more common to developing countries.
110
It has become evident that even highly developed countries can encounter serious difficulties when trying to refinance their sovereign debt, and that they may even 107. On the single mandate of the ECB, see discussion supra Part II.C. 
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default. The Euro zone, therefore, requires measures that have longterm stabilizing effects. For the banking sector, the EU is planning a refinancing and restructuring regime.
111
On the sovereign level, solutions are more difficult to find, though the Euro zone pursues two approaches. A permanent fund is intended to provide financial emergency assistance to member countries, 112 while a restructuring regime is meant to prevent or deal with sovereign default.
A. SOVEREIGN DEBT RESOLUTION MECHANISM (SDRM)
The idea of a restructuring regime for sovereign debtors is not new. It has not only been a topic in academic circles, but was also discussed by the G10 in 2002.
113
Since insolvency principles do not apply to sovereign debtors, there have been plans to establish an internationally recognized restructuring procedure, the basic principles of which would be similar to the Chapter 11 framework under US bankruptcy law.
114
Such a procedure would lead to a moratorium of sovereign debt and implement a restructuring plan effective to all creditors of a sovereign. The major advantage of such an approach is its comprehensive effect: all claims against the sovereign can be treated equally; the haircut is paramount. The disadvantages are similarly striking: both the sovereign and the debtors become subject to the decision of a third party that forces its rules upon them. This raises the question of within which institution such powers could be vested-potentially the IMF, a UN institution, or a yet-to-be-created international court.
116
In the absence of a sovereign restructuring regime, arbitration tribunals hold an important role in stateinvestor disputes.
117
In the EU, it seems more feasible to overcome reservations against a Sovereign Debt Resolution Mechanism ("SDRM"). The EU could establish general binding rules for the restructuring of sovereign debt and create an institution to execute the restructuring, namely, create a chamber for restructuring at the ECJ.
118
For the time being, however, such approaches are not being pursued. However, more Euro zone defaults, such as the Greek default of March 2012, 119 could revive the idea of a European SDRM.
B. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
Compared to an SDRM, collective action clauses pursue a modest approach. They also enable the restructuring of a sovereign's debt in bonds, but contrary to an SDRM, they rely entirely on the principle of consent. This is why, for the time being, the Euro zone favors them over an SDRM.
Nature and Effects of Collective Action Clauses
Collective action clauses in sovereign bond issues can be defined as a compendium of standardized provisions within sovereign bond publication-detail/publication/446-a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debt-crisisresolution-a-proposal; Beatrice Weder 
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contracts.
120
Their major purpose is to introduce a principle of majority voting into the bond terms. If a qualified majority of bondholders agrees to a proposed restructuring of the bond obligations, all bonds are modified. 121 Majority provisions in collective action clauses thereby deviate from one of the most basic principles of contract law, as the contractual claims of the dissenting minority are modified without their consent.
122
This mechanism is designed to overcome the so-called holdout problem-the phenomenon that bondholders will wait for their peers to give in to the demands of the creditor in order to profit from the compromise and get paid in full. 
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Back in the 1980s, restructurings could be worked out on a multilateral basis by bringing major creditors together to negotiate a deal with the sovereign debtor, for example, according to the principals of the Paris and London Club.
128
This procedure seems to have worked for several sovereign debt crises in Central America in the 1980s. 129 The number of creditors however was more limited than it is today, as funding came predominantly from American, European, and Japanese banks. 130 In contrast, the Argentine crisis escalated because it involved a vast number of foreign investors. 131 The situation in the Euro zone is equally complex; the sovereign debt of the larger Euro zone economies is held by large numbers of investors throughout the world. 132 
The Euro Zone Standardization of Collective Action Clauses
The Euro zone has agreed on a project of revolutionary magnitude: all seventeen Euro zone countries will use standardized collective action clauses. 133 This will catapult collective action clauses in sovereign bond issues from a marginal position to one of core significance. So far there have been a number of frequently used terms in international issues of sovereign bonds that commonly underlie English or New York state law, but there is no set of rules that could be considered a common standard. 134 The purpose of introducing standardized collective action clauses is to establish equal standards for all Euro zone bonds, thus creating transparency and market confidence. Since all countries will
552
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use the same provisions, it can be assumed that the Euro zone politicians hope that collective action clauses will be regarded as a common and neutral element of sovereign bond issues, and not an indicator of a potential sovereign default.
Yet, from a legal perspective, another element is even more fascinating: the enormous volume of sovereign bonds in the Euro zone promises to set a worldwide standard for the first time in the history of sovereign bonds.
135
IV. RESTRUCTURING OF GREEK DEBT
Sovereign bonds are the major source of finance for modern industrialized nations, which rely on a system of revolving debt. The current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone illustrates that once markets lose confidence in the sustainability of a country's debt, market refinancing becomes unaffordable.
Greek debt was restructured in March 2012, when private creditors of the Hellenic Republic accepted an exchange offer that led to a haircut on their debt. Greek domestic bonds were exchanged for new bonds with lower principal, lower interest rates, and longer maturity.
A. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
The Greek restructuring took place in the form of a so-called Private Sector Involvement-a voluntary haircut accepted by the private holders of Greek bond debt. Over ninety percent of Greece's private creditors participated. The remaining holders of Greek bonds withstood political pressure and did not participate in what was called a "voluntary" bond restructuring. In particular, some hedge funds did not trade in their old bonds. As a result, the restructuring was accompanied by Greece's announcement that all remaining old bonds would never be paid. The remaining creditors who defied the exchange would either lose everything or be forced into an exchange. Greece threatened to 
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bondholders, not by the legislative act.
142
However, in the current scenario, this line of argumentation must fail. It is merely formalistic and ignores the predetermined outcome of the law as well as the obvious intentions of the legislator. The Greek scenario is incomparable to the general exercise of standard collective action clauses. The necessary number of bondholders gave its consent prior to the enactment of the law. Furthermore, this law does not define or amend the legal situation in a general way or for an indefinite number of cases. It is meant for exactly one case, and the beneficiary is the country itself. These benefits are not merely incidental, but are the very purpose for which the law is being enacted. In contrast, a typical legislative measure regulates legal relationships in a general way and with no regard to a specific case. If, for example, the legislator changes the laws on rental property, the government may well benefit as part of a multitude of affected landlords. However, this effect is merely incidental and not the pursued legislative purpose. It should follow that when a sovereign chooses to deal with investors on a contractual basis, this method of legal action implies a waiver for any recourse to sovereign powers. It seems contradictory to turn to sovereign powers when conflicts arise in order to avoid being held to contractual promises.
However, some jurisdictions sanction the use of retroactive action clauses. Germany is an example for such jurisdictions as the German statutes on corporate bonds in the Schuldverschreibungsgesetz allow the introduction of retroactive majority provisions into existing bond terms by majority vote. 143 Yet, this possibility under German law is incomparable to the Greek scenario. The Schuldverschreibungsgesetz does not apply to German sovereign bonds; by enacting this law, the German legislator acted in its general legislative capacity and regulated the contractual relationship of third parties in an abstract and general way, not the contractual relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to investors in its bonds.
